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EIS NEED NOT DISCUSS INFEASIBLE SITE
ALTERNATIVES

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: The Army Corps of Engineers did not
abuse its discretion under the National Environmental Protection Act
by failing to discuss in the Environmental Impact Statement alternatives it had determined to be economically infeasible. Kentucky v.
Alexander, 655 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1981).
The Indiana Port Commission (IPC) is responsible for the promotion
of agricultural, industrial and commercial development of Indiana through
public port facilities.' In 1971, the IPC commissioned a feasibility study
to determine possible locations for a port and industrial complex. 2 Five
possible areas were named: Aurora, Madison, Jeffersonville, New Albany,
and Tell City.
Aurora and Madison, two of the less populated areas, were eliminated
by the IPC because one of its prerequisites was that the chosen area have
a work force of at least 50,000. The IPC preferred Jeffersonville and New
Albany because their high growth rate made them the most economically
feasible. Six Mile Island was chosen as the optimal location in the Jeffersonville-New Albany area.
The IPC then applied for a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers
to construct the proposed facility. The Corps, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. 1503
(1980), developed a draft environmental impact statement (EIS). In discussing site alternatives, the Corps listed the criteria used in the 1971
IPC feasibility study and suggested, in one sentence, an additional site.
Several comments solicited from federal agencies and others stated that
the discussion of alternatives was inadequate under the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA). 3
The discussion of alternatives was, therefore, expanded for the final
EIS. The discussion recounted the process the IPC feasibility study used
to choose the Jeffersonville-New Albany area as the preferred site. Thirty
days were given to comment on the final EIS. No one commented on the
sufficiency of the alternatives discussion. The Corps held two more hear1. The Indiana Port Commission is a quasi-governmental agency established by the State of
Indiana, but receives most of its funds from user fees at the various ports it has constructed. Interview
with Jim Peel, Deputy Port Director of the IPC (November 3, 1981).
2. Kentucky v. Alexander, 655 F.2d 714, 716 (6th Cir. 1981).
3. See 42 U.S.C. §4332(C) (1976).
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ings, but again no comments were received on the inadequate discussion
of alternatives. A permit was granted in June, 1979. Kentucky brought
suit in district court against the Corps of Engineers alleging that the final
EIS gave inadequate consideration to Aurora, Madison, Tell City, and
Louisville as possible alternatives to Six Mile Island, and the IPC intervened.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Kentucky and
held that the EIS inadequately considered alternative sites to the port and
industrial complex. 4 The district court denied summary judgment on all
other issues raised by Kentucky. The IPC appealed to the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals and Kentucky cross-appealed.
Although Section 102(2) of NEPA requires every environmental impact
statement to contain a detailed statement of alternatives to the proposed
action, 5 every conceivable alternative to a proposed action need not be
discussed. 6 Citing North Slope Borough v. Andrus,7 the court stated that
the degree of detail used in discussing alternatives is a matter of agency
discretion. The inquiry of the Court of Appeals, then, was whether the
discussion of alternatives was so inadequate as to be an abuse of discretion. The Sixth Circuit held that the Corps of Engineers did not abuse its
discretion in limiting its discussion of alternatives.' It based its decision
on two separate considerations: 1) Kentucky's failure to participate in
agency proceedings; and 2) the infeasibility of those alternatives which
were not discussed.
First, citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear PowerCorporationv. The Natural
Resources Development Council, Inc.,' the court wrote that Kentucky's
degree of participation in the agency proceedings is a significant factor
in determining if an abuse of discretion occurred."° Kentucky failed to
meet its obligation to meaningfully participate. The state did not comment
on the EIS when the Corps could have taken "corrective action without
undue delay." '1
4. 655 F.2d at 718.
5. Section 102(2) of NEPA, which is found at 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C), mandates that all agencies
of the Federal Government "include in every recommendation or report or proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a
detailed statement by the responsible official on . . . alternatives to the proposed action." The case
includes, as if it were part of the statutory language, that every conceivable alternative need not be
discussed. That principle was developed in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435
U.S. 519 (1978).
6. Kentucky v. Alexander, 655 F.2d 714, 718 (6th Cir. 1981).
7. 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
8. The court did not reverse the summary judgment and remand to the district. Rather the court
reversed the summary judgment and, in effect, granted summary judgment in favor of the IPC by
holding that the discussion of alternatives was adequate.
9. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
10. Kentucky v. Alexander, 655 F.2d 714, 718 (6th Cir. 1981).
11. Id. at 718.
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Second, the court said that if the agency made a sufficient showing of
infeasibility in the administrative record, that infeasible site need not be
discussed in the EIS. The court may therefore examine the record to see
if an alternative site warrants more discussion in the EIS. The court found2
that neither the final EIS nor the record showed that the site was feasible. '
Kentucky also argued that the Corps should have considered the proposed Louisville port, which was first suggested as an alternative by the
EPA after the draft EIS was published. In the final EIS, the Corps wrote
that since no permit had been sought, the Louisville port was too speculative to be considered an alternative. Because Kentucky never urged
the Louisville alternative and the proposal was purely speculative, the
Corps did not abuse its discretion by giving the Louisville site "scant
attention. "'3
Kentucky next argued that the Corps was arbitrary in its consideration
of increased erosion. Again the court emphasized Kentucky's failure to
so challenge in the agency proceedings. Although Kentucky presented an
affidavit from an expert challenging the methodology used and the conclusion reached by those who studied the erosion, mere disagreement
among experts will not invalidate an EIS. The conclusion reached by the
Corps is not arbitrary because "reasonable persons could rely on the
Corps' studies to reach the Corps' conclusion." 4
Kentucky also argued that the EIS failed to adequately consider the
environmental impact of parking barges near the port. Kentucky did not
present evidence that barge parking has a significant environmental impact. Its conclusory allegations were not sufficient to reverse the summary
judgment granted to the Corps on this issue.
Finally Kentucky made two arguments refuted in the EIS itself. First,
it argued that one factor in the Corps' evaluation of the economic viability
of the proposed Indiana port was a highly speculative highway bridge.
The court held that the EIS itself stated that the construction of the bridge
was "speculative at best." ' 5 Second, Kentucky argued that the EIS failed
to consider the environmental impact of potential oil spills. Again, the
court stated that although the Corps could have considered the problem
of oil spills more completely, it did not abuse its discretion in considering
the problem as it did.
CONCLUSION
The determination of whether an agency abused its discretion in considering site alternatives involves two steps. The first inquiry concerns
12. It is unclear, then, whether the maker of the EIS has the burden of establishing the infeasibility
of alternatives or if the challenger has the burden of establishing the feasibility of alternatives.
13. Kentucky v. Alexander, 655 F.2d 714, 720 (6th Cir. 1981).
14. Id. at 720.
15. Id. at 721.
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the degree of participation by the party that is challenging the sufficiency
of the EIS. Failure to meaningfully participate by the challenger counsels
against a finding that the agency abused its discretion. The second inquiry
determines, either through the administrative record or through the EIS,
if the alternative sites are feasible. If they are not, they need not be
discussed. If a positive showing is made that the sites are feasible, the
agency must treat the alternatives with a higher degree of specificity. The
limited discussion of alternatives in the Corps' EIS did not involve an
abuse of discretion.
Kentucky v. Alexander affirms the practical approach to alternatives
taken by the United States Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. NRDC.' 6 The agency does not have to discuss remote
and speculative alternatives. Alternatives must be bound by some notion
of feasibility. Although the agency has the burden of discussing every
significant aspect of environmental impact for a particular project, the
challenger must comment in such a way as to show the agency that its
contentions are significant.
Vermont Yankee, then, requires the challenger of the EIS to show that
the alternative has some degree of feasibility. Kentucky v. Alexander at
least opens up the argument that the burden is on the author of the EIS
to show that the alternative is infeasible, thereby going one step farther
than the court in Vermont Yankee.
WENDY YORK

16. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).

